Artillery is Russia’s “God of War”

• The key to Russia’s actions against Ukraine is overwhelming artillery fire.

• For Western armies, the value of artillery seems to reduce the charm of smart bombs.

• Russian officers view artillery as a means to waste the enemy and scare the defenders.

Survivors recalled the murder of Russian cannons. “All the fortress at the center of the enemy line, powerful artillery has been causing such fear of destruction in our ranks.”

The date was September 7, 1812, and was the place where the Battle of Borodino was the chief of staff of Napoleon’s army. But it’s easy to be a German soldier in Stalingrad in 1943, or a Ukrainian soldier in Bakhmut in 2023.

Joseph Stalin was a famous artillery decades ago. Russia has worshipped the worship of cannons for centuries, and it is still the case today. In the Ukrainian war, it was better than its Spetznaz Commando or Sukhoi Fighter jets, which was the key to Russian operations, allowing tactically clumsy Russian infantry and armor to bombard with 10,000 shells a day under bombing to bomb. Some estimates that Russia has about 5,000 artillery troops in Ukraine as of February 2024.

“The importance of cannons on the Russian battlefield exceeds their effectiveness on the battlefield,” Giangiuseppe Pili, Brett Evans and Ryder Finn wrote in an article by the British think tank Royal Joint Service Academy. “The deployment has become directly politically significant through history and the present moment, and Russia’s determination to achieve its goals can be seen, regardless of the degree of damage involved or civilian casualties.”

Russia not only regards artillery as a tool of destruction, but also a weapon that terrifies the enemy. “The psychological impact of Russian cannons is not an unexpected consequence, but a deliberate feature of their combat strategies,” the author said.

Russia’s use of artillery dates back to the 16th century, when Cannon was prevalent on the European battlefield. Just like other European armies in the 18th and 19th centuries, artillery became more prestigious than infantry and cavalry because it required educated officials (Napoleon began his young artillery officer).

Fierce weapon tactics stimulated the Ukrainian army and squads to take root in World War I. Despite the poor performance of the Tsarist army on the Eastern Front, it was the innovative use of large artillery that made the 1916 Brusilov offensive capability one of Russia’s few successful offensives in World War I. Preparatory bombing uses new technologies, such as reconnaissance aircraft to guide gunfire, while short but intense elastic force maximizes surprises. The large number of shells shocked the defenders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and blew up holes in the barbed wire, allowing the Russian infantry to one day capture 26,000 soldiers.

“The Russian military experience in World War I was based on the use of artillery by Russian troops: it was obvious that it relied on aviation reconnaissance for accurate indirect artillery obstacles; it was effective to use artillery in psychological actions; it was used as a tool for obstacles, a tool for rapid attacks in order to quickly carry out attacks.

The pinnacle of Russian artillery was World War II, a conflict that Russians call the great patriotic war, a documentary and propaganda film commemorated by endless documentaries and fiery Katyusha rockets. During its last Soviet pilot in Berlin in April 1945, the Red Army criticized nearly 10,000 howitzers, mortars and multiple rocket launchers that probably fired more than one million shells on the first day.

Before the war, Russian experts recommended 75 to 100 guns per kilometer to break the enemy’s defense. Rusi noted: “In the late stages of World War II, the Soviet Union’s breakthrough front density was 150 to 200 guns per kilometer,” or about 320 guns per mile. This gap “shows the Red Army’s reliance on its industrial capacity to drown the enemy with devastating artillery fire.”

If Russia invaded Western Europe during the Cold War, artillery would provide most of the firepower to the Rhine. However, Cannon has limited value in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

Like the Western armies in the 21st century, the perceived value of artillery seems to reduce the charm of smart bombs and missiles. “In the Suvorov era [an 18th Century Russian general]The Rusi author points out that artillery is one of the most respected and prestigious branches of the Russian army, an idea that has been largely forgotten by the full invasion of Ukraine. ”

Indeed, drones and launched glide bombs have become the backbone of successful new Russian attack strategies. However, when the weather was too bad, the bomber could not fly, and the drone was blocked too heavily, the artillery had moments.

Russia sent Soviet and post-Soviet artillery men in Ukraine. Howitzers include the new 2S19 MSTA-SM2 self-promoted 152mm howitzer (up to 25 miles), as well as the old M-30 122mm towed howitzer (range about 7 miles).

Russia has also deployed a range of truck-mounted multiple launch rocket systems (MLRs), including the new Tornado S with a 12,300mm rocket (up to 75 miles) and a BM-27 Uragan 220mm rocket system (up to 45 miles). While multiple rocket launchers were used in World War II for inaccurate but devastating saturation bombing, modern Russian MLRs could also fire guided pellets.

“Architecture is seen as an intermediate weapon between strategic weapons (such as nuclear missiles) and purely conventional arms,” ​​Rusi concluded. “There is no reason to believe that in future wars, Russia will not use artillery as a means of exerting political and psychological pressure and expressing determination internally and externally.”

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine and other publications. He holds a Master of Political Science from Roger University. Follow him twitter and LinkedIn.

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