This is perhaps the most pressing question in January’s fires in Los Angeles: How did officials fail to evacuate alarms in time, sending timely evacuation alerts to residents of West Altadena, and did all officials except for 18 deaths in the Eaton fire?
After nearly five months of the fatal fires destroyed Altadena, two possible situations have emerged as to what went wrong with that chaotic night. Either there is some human error along the command chain that emits evacuation, or there is some type of technical error when sending the alert.
An independent investigation was conducted after The Times revealed a failure in mid-January. But it is unclear what investigators have found, with county officials repeatedly refusing to answer questions and delaying answers to public records requests, often citing ongoing inquiries.
But growing evidence suggests that the critical shortage (the flames migrate to West Altadena for hours before residents receive any evacuation alerts – stemming from human error, possibly in decision-making processes, inter-agency communications or both.
Last week, U.S. Rep. Robert Garcia (D-Long Beach) told The Times that human error appears to be the reason West Altadena delayed the alert. He spoke after publishing a report on evacuation alert issues during the fire, but noted that his federal investigation did not focus on Altadena’s issues. The investigations initiated by the Los Angeles congressional delegation focused on a series of flawed evacuation alerts that erroneously urged millions of people in Los Angeles County, rather than a few residents near Calabasas, to prepare for evacuation.
Kathryn Barger, the director who represented Altadena and strongly criticized the delay, told The Times that she was still unaware that it was completely wrong that night, but said she believed there could be a “communication breakdown” between county fire, sheriff and emergency management officials, the agency that jointly issued the evacuation alert.
Further pointing to possible human failures, Genasys’ CEO, a company that provides emergency alert software for the Los Angeles County Emergency Management Office, told shareholders in March that West Altadena’s delayed alert was not the result of a technical error.
County officials have not commented on the claim or others, citing an ongoing investigation by McChrystal Group, an independent contractor specializing in disaster management.
But as the investigation continues, there is a bit quiet about which agency or issue that could lead to delayed alerts.
It was not until around 3:30 a.m. on January 8, nearly nine hours after the fire broke out, and hours after smoke and flames threatened the area, West Altadena issued an electronic evacuation order. The Times comments showed that it was not until around 6:40 pm on January 7 that neighbors east of North Lake Avenue were ordered to evacuate some communities before they were nearly 6:40 pm.
Initially, officials avoided talking directly about what might be wrong with West Altardna. Instead, they described the night as pure chaos, trying to keep the fire, which quickly turned into a large city fire, driven by unstable hurricane storm that took the planes early in the battlefield. In the first few hours, fire departments from Pasadena, Los Angeles County and Angeles National Forest responded to the brush fire that broke out in Eaton Canyon, not far from home.
Within hours, officials entered a larger unified command structure from the Rose Bowl as federal and state teams joined in response, as well as other local fire departments, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the County Emergency Management Office. Officials described a joint process between county firefighters, sheriffs and OEM officials to determine the necessary evacuation and ensure that the implementation is carried out through two wireless alerts, namely Ping phones within a certain geographical area and in the ground patrol.
But from around midnight to 3 a.m. – as the Eaton fire began to make a frightening run westward – there was no electronic evacuation alarm.
No one can explain what the problem is.
When Sheriff Robert Luna called the evacuation process a cooperative effort, he downplayed the agency’s role in the decision-making section in February, explaining that firefighters usually lead as they closely track fire behavior, the movement of the fire and the associated weather.
“We are included in decision making, but they are leaders,” Luna said in a previous interview. “Even if it’s a unified order, I rely on experts.”
However, there are some concerns about the gap between some of the group’s representatives and the efforts of the central commander. Several West Altadena residents told Times that some of their neighbors had deputies assisted with the evacuation at about 2 a.m., around 2 a.m., before the 3:30 AM alarm came out. It is unclear whether these representatives failed to communicate their surrounding conditions and increased demand for evacuation, or whether the update was ignored.
Later, the New York Times report showed that the county emergency management office had not started to issue wireless emergency alerts until recently using the Genasys system, less training and testing than other counties implementing the system. Public records also show that on the evening of January 7, only one person alerted three fires that broke out across the county: Eaton, Palisade and Hurst.
But anonymous sources within the county told The Times that Siltardner’s mistake was not the OEM officials’ fault. Sources said the OEM team issued an evacuation order shortly after being ordered to do so – a revelation that appears to blame the county fire or sheriff’s officers.
Luna declined to comment further on the situation, citing an ongoing investigation.
County Fire Chief Anthony Marrone confirmed this week that he had been interviewed by the McChrystal Group, and many of his commanders were interviewed. But he said he hadn’t been told what was wrong.
“I’m waiting for what they found,” Mullen said. “It’s a complex issue and I think we all have to do better.”
In a recent interview, Pasadena Fire Chief Chad Augustin echoed other command center officials who told the Times: He doesn’t remember a moment or a point when they realize they made a mistake or messed up West Altardna’s evacuation alarm.
Augustine said he did remember the major shift in the wind and asked the fire commander to adjust as soon as possible. He estimated that the commander of the Rose Bowl began receiving “Good Intel” from the team at about 2 or 3 a.m. on the grounds that the wind was shifting gears and pushing the West, requiring more evacuations, but he couldn’t remember the exact timing.
“You’re trying to do everything you can, the wind direction, the wind conditions, the wind conditions,” Augustine said. “You have a lot of leadership that they’re trying to make real-time decisions based on the Intel they’re receiving.”
Augustine said he expected the post-action report to find that any drawbacks from that night came from the rapid transfer of the fire and the delay in how the evacuation alert was issued on the county’s electronic alert system.
“In a massive disaster like this, when you have a wind direction, you will receive messages and try your best to make the best decision possible,” Augustine said. You are “making as much notification as possible based on the resources you have.”
No matter what new information is investigated, some residents say it won’t make a difference: No matter what the findings are, they say, the damage has been done.
“I don’t believe it will really bring it,” said Marisol Espino, a lifelong resident of West Altadena who lost his family’s home in the fire in January.
Some experts worry that public officials may risk alienating more residents by not providing answers. They fear that it may harm future evacuation efforts.
“If we’re four months now and we don’t know about Altadena’s situation, that’s a big problem,” said Isaacson Kailes, a disability policy consultant familiar with the Los Angeles emergency program. “This greatly reduces trust…people are hurt too because they don’t trust the messaging.”
Barger, the Los Angeles County Supervisor representing Altadena, said she knew she was frustrated by the lack of answers, but said investigators were crucial to be thorough.
“While I hope this is quick, it’s not that simple,” Bag said. “In order for us to solve this problem correctly, I want to make sure we are unwavering. …I’m going to give them grace until we get a report.”
The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors began an independent investigation in early February and called for the publication of the report within 90 days. At the end of April, McChrystal Group presented the latest information about its survey, detailing the completed community listening courses, and conducted 33 interviews and 18 interviews. It provides no substantial information about what happened that night.
“I think it’s been four months now, and they’re not only saying it out, it means there’s something behind the surface — sensitive information related to responsibility,” said Thomas Cova, a professor of geography at the University of Utah, who specializes in emergency alerts during wildfires. “I think this is strange.
On a fire night, Espino’s multigenerational family eventually evacuated around 9 p.m. – far before any formal evacuation orders – at the time she attributed to being too cautious.
Now, she’s grateful that they went out while they did. She said knowing neighbors who were waiting to leave orders, barely left—or not.
“Nothing can tell us we’re in danger,” Espino said.
But it is no surprise that evacuation failures affected this part of Altadena compared to the East, she said. West Altadena has become an enclave of black house ownership, partly the result of red lines and discrimination in the surrounding areas, including East Altadena. It has also become a growing home to Latin Americans like Espino and her family.
A resident of the senior center was evacuated as the Eaton fire approached Tuesday, January 7, 2025.
(Ethan Swope/AP)
She said she grew up feeling like West Altadena and its residents were often overlooked or forgotten. This failure to issue a timely evacuation alert will only exacerbate this distrust. Espino is now recovering, rebuilding and preparing for future emergencies with her displaced neighbors.
“I learned that we need to take care of our elderly population-community,” said Espino, a neighborhood captain who is now a grassroots organization. “We will take safety measures for ourselves.”
But for those seeking formal answers, the next investigation update for the McChrystal Group investigation did not expire until late July. It is not clear whether the complete post-action report at that time will be completed.
In a statement this week, the county-coordinated Joint Information Center set up a response to the fire, which he said “answered many questions about our collective response to the fire”, but it would not guess the cause of the evacuation delay and there was no complete information.
“The McChrystal Group’s process not only reviews information about first responders and emergency management professionals, but also from the public who have experienced fires and first-hand responses,” the statement said.
Staff writers Terry Castleman and Rebecca Ellis contributed to the report.
