7 Important gains from the Israeli military about what happened on October 7
The IDF mostly investigated what happened on October 7, 2023, and the days before the Hamas Holocaust. During the preliminary investigation in November 2023, the outgoing chief of staff of IDF, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, ordered all units to begin the investigation in March 2024. The IDF avoids providing advice in its report, saying that the people will be left to Income IDF Chief of Staff Maj.
The ruins of buildings destroyed by Israeli forces following a conflict between Israeli and Palestinian forces clashed with Israeli Berry on October 13, 2023.
October 7th is not over yet. A year later, 101 hostages are still held in Gaza
According to the IDF’s assessment, 5,000-5,600 militants infiltrated Israel in three waves. Meanwhile, 4,696 rockets and mortars were fired at Israel. The attack killed 76 foreign nationals and 415 security personnel in 829. In addition, 251 hostages were taken to the Gaza Strip.
“The basic failure was due to the failure to understand Hamas’ intentions and prepare for a large-scale surprise attack,” a senior IDF official said in the report.
According to the IDF, the Hamas attacks were not in a hurry, with plans starting nearly seven years before the massacre began, and the “basic concept” was established in November 2016 and the “initial plan” was formulated in July 2017. Hamas’ plan was approved in July 2019, the operation plan was formulated in early August 2021, and a one-year plan was formulated in early 2021. The scope of the program is intended to be carried out.
Hamas considered many dates of the attack, including September 16, Rosh Hashanah of the Rosh Hashanah and September 25, Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, the IDF said. Finally, on October 7, 2023, this coincides with Simchat Torah’s Jewish holiday, which marks the end and reopening of the Torah.
Read on the Fox News app
Review the timeline of Israel’s war with Hamas after October 7
According to IDF’s assessment, the attack began to form in the early morning of October 7. Hamas allegedly began preparing troops around 11:00 pm on October 6, after spending most of the time throughout the day putting them on alert and collecting weapons, and ending the briefing at 4:00 AM on October 7.
The infiltration itself began in the first wave at 6:29 a.m., when 1,154 Hamas’ Nukhba troops invaded, breaking security barriers between Gaza and Israel. The IDF declared a state of emergency at 6:43 a.m. and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) followed suit.
Between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m., there are 3,400 militants in Israel’s territory. In addition, before 8:00 a.m., Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif called on civilians in Gaza to join the attack. The assessment noted that after 9:00 a.m., the attacker took advantage of the IDF failure and seized the opportunity for further attacks. Some people allegedly plan to go deep into Israeli territory.
The IDF stopped several “main attacks” around 1:00 pm, but there are still hundreds of attackers in Israel at 3:00 pm. The IDF said it gained control of some communities and surrounding areas by 9:00 pm, but dozens of them appeared around midnight.
“We did not predict that Hamas would be so cruel in the fight,” wrote a senior IDF official.
Much of the IDF’s focus was before the October 7 attacks Iran and Hezbollah, which Hamas was defined as a secondary threat at the time. Furthermore, the IDF believes it can include Hamas activities as it is committed to “gradually improving existing reality” to eliminate terrorist organizations.
The IDF also believes that “Hamas does not want a full-scale war”, which has led Israel to conclude that a large-scale invasion is unlikely. In the assessment, the IDF said Hamas used Israel’s view of the situation and took advantage of Israel’s strengths.
Another major misunderstanding highlighted in the assessment is that the IDF believes that the main threat to Hamas is rockets and mortars fired from Gaza. This combined with the dependence on defense strategies and obstacles, and the reduction of troops on the Israeli-Gaza border will lead to disaster.
Israel’s Intelligence Agency does not fully grasp or analyze its Intel for Hamas and its intentions. Obviously, this also applies to the IDF’s view of the Shia “axis” and its view on Israel. The IDF said it discovered deep root problems between the Intelligence Agency and culture during the review.
Since 2018, the Intelligence Agency has been collecting information about the Hamas concept to attack Israel on a large scale. However, the plan was considered unfeasible and was considered to reflect Hamas’ long-term goals.
In August 2021, Intel described plans on a Hamas military unit to carry out a large-scale attack on Israeli communities and military posts around the Gaza Strip. Intelligence officials failed to establish a connection between the new Intel and the 2018 collection.
Intelligence received in the months ended October 7 suggests that Hamas is training for the attack. This clearly changed the situation’s assessment by Israel’s elite 8200, but it allegedly did not communicate with the senior leadership.
Israeli soldiers inspected cars for the festival parade at the scene of Hamas gunmen attacking Nova Festival near the Israeli border with the Gaza Strip on October 13, 2023.
Israeli troops found bodies of three hostages at the festival on October 7
On the evening of October 6, 2023, the Israeli SIM card was activated inside Gaza. However, this is not alerted as it has happened before. These same SIM cards will later allow Hamas militants to cross the border into Israel. There were also signs that the Hamas leaders were meeting that night. However, none of these facts are enough to change the Intelligence Agency’s way of thinking about Gaza, and therefore there is no alert.
That night, there were also signs of the usual and unusual Hamas activities. Surveys show that some sources of intelligence can be used overnight to enhance unused information. However, the IDF asserted that the IDF with intelligence instructions changed the assessment of the situation and that there would be higher alerts for the localized Hamas offense, but no full-scale war.
It was found that the IAF had met or even exceeded the definition criteria for ready-to-be, except for two instances caused by the fires of the big rockets. However, these standards are not consistent with the conditions required to prepare for large-scale surprise attacks. The IDF concluded that it was a “major difficulty” to distinguish IDF troops, civilians and terrorists from each other.
Although the IAF hit the critical HAMAS command center, the IDF acknowledged that it would be a challenge to determine whether there will be more effective strike efforts in this situation, even in the review of the strike.
However, it was noted that the IDF was not preparing for things like the October 7 massacre.
“We are addicted to the exact intelligence and information we have obtained as commanders without considering other circumstances. This failure will always be left over from our memories and we will never and never forget it,” wrote the senior IDF official.
A destroyed house in Kfar Aza, Israel, after a battle between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian terrorists on October 10, 2023.
In its conclusion, the IDF notes that the assessment of the situation in Gaza and Hamas is so entrenched in the agency that there is no in-depth discussion of other possibilities. Furthermore, it now says that trying to “conflict management” Hamas is “incorrect” and that threat removal should be prioritized in the future.
The assessment also addresses the possibility of future attacks, saying prevention strategies will be key.
Original article source: 7 Important gains from the Israeli military about what happened on October 7
